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[Crim. No. 5779. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ANTHONY OITRINO,
Appellant.

[1J Criminal Law - Appeal- Objections - Evidence. - Where a
criminal case was tried before the Supreme Court's decision
in People v. Oahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, defendant
is not precluded from raising on appeal the question that
illegally obtained evidence was admitted against him though
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the
trial.
[2] Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where the record is
silent as to whether officers searching premises and defendant's automobile had a search warrant and there is no evidence showing illegality of the search, it must be presumed
that the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 15, 33.)
[3] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-Where
officers could have testified to the presence of a conditional
sales contract without removing it from the house that was
searched and thus could have shown defendant's ownership
of the automobile in question, he was not prejudiced by
admission of the contract in evidence.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1) Criminal Law, § 1079; [2] Searches
and Seizures, § 1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1382; [4] Criminal Law,
§ 393(2); (5) Burglary, §§ 25, 26; [6-8] Burglary, § 40; [9] Witnesses, § 135(4); [10] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [11] Criminal
Law, § 589; [12] Criminal Law, § 1407(9),
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[4] Id.-Evidence-Other Orimes.-Except when it shows merely
criminal disposition, evidence which tends logically and by
reasonable inference to establish any fact material" for the
prosec~tion, or to overcome any material fact to be proved
by the defense, is admissible though it may connect the accused
with an offense not included in the charge.
[6] Burglary-Evidence.-Defendant's possession of atolen tools
is a material fact in a burglary prosecution, and evidence that
some of the tools were found early in the morning in a store
under circumstances indicating that they had been recently
abandoned, coupled with the fact that defendant's recently
driven automobile was parked nearby, is circumstantial evidence that defendant had been in possession of the tools.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Stolen Goods.-Possession alone
of property stolen in a burgla.ry is not of itself sufficient to
sustain the possessor's conviction of that burglary j there must
be corroborating evidence of acts, conduct or declarations of
the accused tending to show his guilt.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Btolen Goods.-When possession
of property stolen in a burglary is shown, the corroborating
evidence may be slight, and failure to show that possession
was honestly obtained is itself a strong circumstance tending
to show the possessor's guilt.
[8] Id.-Evidence-Possession of Btolen Goods.-Proof of defendant's possession of stolen goods accompanied by proof that
he used fictitious names, falsely told a buyer that he received
the property from his father, and disposed of some of the
property at inadequate prices is sufficient to sustain a conviction of burglary.
[9] Witnesses-Oross-examination-Scope.-Where defendant on
direct examination denies any participation in the burglaries
charged, the prosecution can show circumstances that tend to
connect him with the burglaries, and it is proper to ask him
on cross-examination how his automobile got to a certain place
and whether he had been in the vicinity at the time it was
found.
[10] .Oriminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnessu-Orossexamination.-Questions relating to defendant's use of false
addresses in purchasing an automobile were improper on his
eross-examination in a burglary prosecution, but did not result
in prejudice where his use of a false name at the same time
had already properly been shown.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 et seq. j Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 310 et seq.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Burglary, § 38 j Am.Jur., Burglary, § 74.
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[11] Id.-Conduct of OOUDseI.-Where defendant had testified that
he left a certain place because the police were looking for him,
it was not improper for the district attorney to make the observation that defendant was "carefully avoiding that address,"
tbis being a reasonable inference from defendant's testimony.
[12J Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Argument of
l'rosecuting Attome7.-In a prosecution for burglary, the
district attorney's statement in his argument to the jury,
"Here you have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the
latter part of his years to a life of crime," though improper
because not supported by evidence, did not constitute reversible error where the jury was immediately instructed to'
disregard it and in the light of the whole record it did not
affect the verdict.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Eustace Cullinan, Jr.,
Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for burglary. Judgment of conviction of second degree burglary, affirmed.
Anthony Citrino, in pro. per., and Robert E. Tarbox, under
appointment by the District Court of Appeal prior to transfer
of the appeal, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momhoisse, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of
two counts of second degree burglary.
During the evening of June 3, 1954, or the early morning
of June 4th, the premises of William and Frederick Motors
in San Francisco were burglarized. An automobile, various
items of garage equipment, a battery, and tools were taken.
During the evening of June 5, -1954, or the early morning
of June 6th, the premises of Pacific Nash Motor Sales were
burglarized. An automobile and a safe containing the company's records and automobile ownership certificates were
taken. A few days later defendant sold to Ralph Astengo,
a service station operator, some of the tools and equipment
belonging to William and Frederick Motors and their employees. The sale price of $25 was much below the market
value of the items sold. Defendant told Astengo that the
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tools and equipment were his and that " [he] got them from
his father ..•. " Astengo requested and received a bill of
sale from defendant, who signed it with the name "Anthony
Colla. " He returned in about five minutes and changed the
signature to "Anthony Cotelli." At the trial, however, defendant testified that an acquaintance named Gino Cotelli
gave him the tools and equipment and that he did not know
where Cotelli was. When arrested he was asked if he had
sold property under the alias of Cotelli and he refused to
answer. He admitted that he had lived at 345 Second Avenue
in San Francisco under the name of Anthony Colla. He
testified that he shared this house with Bill Bragg and Gino
Cotelli, and that the three of them moved out of the house
on June 17th because an informant told him that Inspector
Keating of the San Francisco Police Department was looking
for him and Bragg. Before defendant's arrest, Inspector
Keating and other officers searched the premises and defend·
ant's automobile, which was parked nearby. They found
property taken in both burglaries in the garage and on the
back porch and in the basement of the house. On a mantelpiece, together with some of defendant's personal papers,
they found a number of the stolen ownership certificates. On
July 9th, tools stolen from William and Frederick Motors
were found in a liquor store in Oakland, following a burglary
thereof. An automobile purchased by defendant under the
name of Robert Jennings was parked in a service station
adjacent to the liquor store. The motor and hood were warm.
Defendant testified that he gave the car to Bragg on about
July 6th, that he did not commit the burglaries, that the
property found by the officers at 345 Second Avenue was
put there by Cotelli, and· that he did not know how the
ownership certificates got onto the mantelpiece.
[1] He contends that illegally obtained evidence was admitted against him. Since this case was tried before our
decision in People v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905],
he is not precluded from raising this question now although
he did not object to the admissibility of the evidence at the
trial. (People v. Kitchens, ante, p. 260 [294 P.2d 17].)
[2] The record, however, is silent as to whether the officers
had a search warrant, and in the absence of any evidence
showing the illegality of the search, we must presume that
the officers regularly and lawfully performed their duties.
(People v. Farrara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21]; Code Civ.
Proe., § 1963(1), (15), (33); People v. Serrano, 123 Cal.App.
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889, 841 [11 P.2d 81] ; Bee also 'Vaughn v. /0'fWJ8, 81 Ca1.2d
586, 601 [191 P.2d 432].) Defendant argues that even if
the officers had a search warrant they exceeded any authority
it might give them (Bee Pen. Code, § 1524) when they took
a conditional sales contract showing his purchase of the automobile found near the liquor store in Oakland. [3] Since
the officers could have testified to the presence of the contract
without removing it from the house and thus have shown
his ownership of the automobile, he was not prejudiced by
the admission into evidence of the contract itself. (0/. People
v. BoyZes, 45 Ca1.2d 652, 654 [290 P.2d 535].)
Defendant contends that the evidence of the commission of
another crime, the burglary of the Oakland liquor store, was
[4] It is now "settled in this state
erroneously admitted.
that except when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence
which tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish
any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any
material fact sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible
although it may connect the accused with an oJfense not included in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Ca1.2d 504, 509
[218 P.2d 981].) [5] Defendant's possession of the stolen
tools was a material fact, and the evidence that some of the
tools were found early in the morning in a store under
circumstances indicating that they had been recently abandoned coupled with the fact that defendant's recently driven
automobile was parked nearby was circumstantial evidence
that defendant had been in possession of the tools.
Defendant's main contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. He argues that there is
nothing in the record to connect him with the burglaries
other than the evidence of his sale of some of the stolen property to Astengo. [6] Possession alone of property stolen
in a burglary is not of itself sufficient to sustain the possessor's conviction of that burglary. There must be corroborating
evidence of acts, conduct, or declarations of the accused
tending to show his guilt. (People v. Boxer, 137 Cal. 562,
563-564 [70 P. 671] ; People v. Carroll, 79 Cal.App.2d 146,
148 [179 P.2d 75].) [7] When possession is shown, however, the corroborating evidence may be slight (People v.
Morris, 124 Cal.App. 402, 404 [12 P.2d 679] ; People v. Taylor,
4 Cal.App.2d 214, 217 [40 P.2d 870] ; People v. BusseU, 34
Cal.App.2d 665, 669 [94 P.2d 400]; People v. Thompson,
120 Cal.App.2d 359, 363 [260 P.2d 1019]), and the failure
to show that possession was honestly obtained is itself a
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strong circumstance tending to show the possessor's guilt of
the burglary. (People v. Lang, 142 Cal. 482, 484-485 [76
P. 232]; People v. Taylor, supra, 4 Ca1.App.2d 214, 217.)
[8] Defendant's explanation that Cotelli gave him the propfrty was not contradicted by any witness, but in view of
defendant's own use of that name and the fact that he did
not know where Cotelli was at the time of the trial, the jury
could reasonably conclude that Cotelli and his gift were both
fictitious. (People v. Buratti, 96 Cal.App.2d 417, 418-419
[215 P.2d 500].) Other corroborative evidence was his false
statement to Astengo that he received the property from
his father (see People v. Conrad, 125 Ca1.App.2d 184, 185
r270 P.2d 31] ; People v. Goodall, 104 Cal.App.2d 242, 247
[231 P.2d 119] ; People v. Mercer, 103 Cal.App.2d 782, 789
[230 P.2d 4] ; People v. Buratti, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 417,
419; People v. Russell, supra, 34 Cal.App.2d 665, 669), his
selling tools and equipment worth more than $150 for $25
(see People v. Buratti, s'upra, at 419), his using the aliases
"Anthony Colla" and" Anthony Cotelli" in making the sale
(see People v. Bl,ratti, supra, at 419; People v. Morris, supra,
124 Ca1.App. 402, 404), and his testimony that he and the
others moved out of the house on Second Avenue because an
informant told him that Inspector Keating was looking for
him and that he bought the automobile found in Oakland
under the name of Robert Jennings because the inspector
was looking for him under the name of Anthony Colla.
[9] Defendant also contends that the trial court erroneously permitted thp. district attorney to question him beyond
the proper limits of cross-examination. (Pen. Code, § 1323.)
On direct examination defendant denied any participation
in the two burglaries charged. On cross-examination he was
asked how his automobile got to Oakland and whether he had
been in the vicinity at the time it was found. The questions
were proper, for when a defendant takes the stand and makes
a general denial of the crime with which he is charged, the
prosecution ean show circumstances that tend to connect him
with it. (People v. Zerillo, 36 Cal.2d 222, 227-229 [223 P.2d
223].) [10] Questions relating to defendant's use of false
addresses in purchasing the automobile were improper, but
he could not have been prejudiced by them, since his use of a
false name at the same time had already properly been shown.
[11] Defendant contends that the district attorney was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct in making an offer of proof
til C.JcI-l.
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and in his argument to the jury. In attempting to determine
defendant's reason for ftight when he heard that Inspector
Keating was looking for him, the district attorney asked defendant why he abandoned an automobile at the Second Avenue residence. Upon defendant's objection and the court's
observation that the examination was somewhat afield, the
district attorney stated, "Well, your Honor, the car was
seen at Second Avenue. The man was carefully avoiding that
address after the burglary." The observation that defendant
was "carefully avoiding that address" was a reasonable inference from defendant's own testimony that he left because
the police were looking for him, and even if the statement
that "the ear was seen at Second Avenue" was "somewhat
afield," it would not justify a reversal. [12] The district attorney's statement in his argument to the jury, "Here yon
have a man at the age of 22 who has devoted the latter part of
his years to a life of crime" was not supported by the evidence
and was therefore improper. The jury, however, was immediately instructed to disregard it, and in the light of the
whole record we do not believe that it affected their verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred. Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance but
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion with
respect to the rule announced in People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d
504 [218 P.2d 981J,in which case I dissented. I do not
believe that the facts in the Woods ease are analogous to
the facts in the case at bar or that it is necessary to rely
on the Woods case as authority for the conclusion· reached
in the ease at bar.
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